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Who is in Charge? A Shrinking Alliance
The military intervention of July 3, 2013 that toppled the 
year-long rule of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) marked a 
new chapter in the history of Egypt’s state. Thirty months 
of contestation and negotiation had followed the January 
2011 uprising, and many Egyptians once again took to the 
streets, this time to call for the ouster of Islamist Presi-
dent Mohamed Morsi. Protestors were supported by key 
state institutions. Far from homogenous, the alliance that 
toppled the MB included the business cronies of former 
President Hosni Mubarak, their allies in the police and in 
the state bureaucracy, and their old rivals within other 
state institutions (primarily within the judiciary and the 
military). Notably, however, the anti-Morsi forces also 
included liberal politicians and pro-democracy revolu-
tionaries who had been active in the 2011 uprising. 
Within a few weeks, the discourse of a “war on poten-
tial terrorism” had brought about a shift in the alliance’s 
common denominator. Now, instead of pursuing the 
broad but ambiguous goal of “restoring the revolution” of 
2011, a clearer slogan emerged: “restoring the state.”1 This 
necessarily excluded the more radical pro-democracy 
camp, which had played such an important role in the 
2011 upheaval but remained persistently spontaneous and 
not institutionalized. The “war on terrorism” meant that 
the “democratic” camp within the new regime – namely 
the camp led by the liberal Mohammed ElBaradei (which 
briefly comprised a handful of ministers and members 
of the constitutional amendments committee) – was 
The Egyptian Interregnum
The High Cost of Suppressing Change
Ibrahim El-Houdaiby
“The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum  
a great variety of morbid symptoms appears.”— Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks 
The crisis Gramsci refers to is palpable in Egypt. The military regime, while putting 
little effort into preventing (or even slowing down) its own demise, is vehemently pre-
venting the birth of “the new.” Three years of legislative vacuum (preceding the recent 
election of a new, tamed parliament) and continuously resorting to the rhetoric of “war 
on terrorism” in order to brutally silence the opposition have completely blocked the 
political sphere and put the political system on hold. Meanwhile, the alliance back-
ing President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is fragile to the point of collapse. The government’s 
lack of a clear overarching vision is leading to unprecedented levels of politicization, 
fragmentation, discord, and violation of the law within the state apparatus. Infighting 
seems no longer to be bracketed by a set of common interests. While the regime 
asks for patience as it pursues “stability” and “state building,” it seems to be taking a 
path with two possible outcomes: total collapse or gradual decay, the morbid symp-
toms of which are already evident.
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increasingly sidelined. As polarization mounted and “war 
on terrorism” rhetoric intensified, the liberals received 
a major blow on August 14, 2013, when government 
forces stormed two pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda 
squares in Cairo. The massacre resulted in the deaths 
of at least 600 MB supporters, and prompted ElBaradei 
to resign in protest from his vice presidency, a position 
he had held for a mere four weeks. The remnants of the 
liberal camp were further alienated by a raft of restric-
tive legal measures, including the protest law of Novem-
ber 2013, which enabled a massive wave of arrests and 
widespread suppression of protests. In the aftermath of 
the January 2014 constitutional referendum, the presence 
and influence of the pro-democracy movement became 
almost invisible.
Thus, in just a few months, the military-led govern-
ment had managed to banish most of its rivals from the 
political scene. Islamists, revolutionaries, and liberals 
(shorthand for a range of varied and fragmented positions 
within the political spectrum) were effectively crippled 
after almost three years as actors within the interim 
Egyptian polity – albeit in unequal weights.
Of course, the exclusion of the newcomers did not 
simply translate into a more harmonious ruling alliance. 
Nor did it lead to the mere restoration of Mubarak’s old 
regime. This had to do with the fact that the 2011 uphea-
val had been catalyzed in an important sense by internal 
contest within the Mubarak regime itself.
Fragmentation under Mubarak
Indeed, the final years of Mubarak’s reign had seen the 
regime’s split into two camps: Mubarak’s son and his busi-
ness associates and neoliberal technocrats, on one hand, 
and the state’s core institutions, most notably the military 
and the judiciary, on the other. As the former embarked 
on a project of massive privatization, pushing for legal 
and structural reforms that would effectively dismantle 
the post-colonial quasi-socialist state of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, the latter – in their capacity as traditional “guard-
ians” of the state – struggled to slow down these reforms. 
At the same time, the distinction was far from clear 
between those who advocated neoliberal reforms and 
those who sought to preserve the regime’s historical soci-
al base. The triumph of the economic language of figures 
and statistics that came to dominate different spheres of 
life depoliticized these reforms and forced their oppo-
nents to make major concessions. Rather than rejecting 
reforms wholesale, they could merely advocate domains 
of exception. The military-industrial complex was exem-
pted from privatization, as was the largest builder of the 
new gated-communities and development projects (one 
of the fastest growing sectors in the Egyptian economy in 
the neoliberal age). The majority of these projects went 
not to the emergent business class, but to the Ministry 
of Defense.2 Moreover, far-reaching interest networks 
had meshed senior bureaucrats with “technocrats” and 
businessmen in an alliance that was considerably insti-
tutionalized within the powerful Policies Committee of 
Mubarak’s ruling party, the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), which was dissolved in April 2011. That alliance 
was sustained via strong ties (also facilitated by, but not 
limited to, business interests) to the police, gradually re-
placed the military as the regime’s stick in the 1990s. The 
military and the judiciary, however, were less susceptible 
to these ideological and economic pressures, thanks to 
their relative distance from the pressure groups. (This 
was only relative however, for it should be recalled that 
military generals were invited – through the corrupt 
networks of cronyism – to become parts of the rising 
alliance when “privatization allowed many members of 
the military, usually through their relatives, to become 
private entrepreneurs.”3)
Far from acting as an even semi-harmonious entity, 
therefore, state institutions were considerably fragment-
ed in the last years of Mubarak’s rule. The malfunctioning 
political system was hardly up to the task of negotiating 
their disputes. This system was in one important respect 
an extension of conflicts within the state and a means of 
lobbying for different interests using both government 
and opposition candidates. This was particularly the 
case in the parliament, which saw a steady increase of 
members from business, rising from 12 percent in 1995 to 
22 percent in the 2005 election, and in the NDP’s Policies 
Committee, which was also dominated by businessmen.
The State of Feifdoms
The upheavals of 2011 further fragmented these state 
institutions. Pressures arising from “outside” the state, 
combined with the absence of an overarching leadership 
capable of containing and negotiating internal disputes, 
led state institutions to feel more vulnerable and hence 
to become more rigid in defending their own interests. 
As all synchronization among institutions gave way to a 
“state of fiefdoms” (Tawa’if),4 the common denominator 
holding the different state institutions together effectively 
collapsed. In the past three years, countless statements 
and actions have manifested this fiefdom-like attitude on 
the part of Egypt’s institutions, from the military’s “loans” 
to the state to the tentative reconciliation (if not peace 
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talks) between the police and the military, and between 
the police and the public prosecutor’s office. 
Intra-institutional fragmentation reached new levels 
of intensity during the short MB reign. The “defeat” of 
the police on January 28, 2011 had led both to the mili-
tary reclaiming the most powerful position in the ruling 
alliance and to the MB joining this new alliance. If this 
alliance enabled both the MB and the military to advance 
their respective interests, the police – relegated into a 
frustrating position of junior partner – began to undergo 
internal splintering. Junior officers, emboldened by the 
overall institutional crisis and by the democratic moment 
of 2011–12, which had allowed for power structures to 
be challenged, called for fairer pay and working condi-
tions. Their initial success was soon reversed as they 
encountered fierce resistance from their seniors.5 Similar 
conflicts took place within other state institutions (most 
notably the judiciary, where the moment of polarization 
only came to a violent end in 2013), and, in the absence 
of negotiation mechanisms, senior bureaucrats lost their 
grip over their respective institutions. By the end of 2013 
both intra-institutional and inter- institutional conflict 
had exploded. It was only the emergence of the MB as a 
common threat that kept the state intact.6 
Upon entering office in June 2014, President Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi had hoped to capitalize on state institu-
tions to counterbalance different pressures. Instead, he 
encountered fragmented institutions susceptible to many 
different types of internal and external pressure. In the 
post-2013 era, this disintegration of state bodies also 
manifested itself in the Egyptian constitution. More than 
a social contract, the new constitution represented a 
contract of the state with itself – and clearly stipulated the 
“independence” (that is, the sovereignty and immunity 
from public oversight) of various state institutions, nota-
bly the military, religious institutions, the judiciary, and 
the police. It also left the elected institutions – parliament 
and local councils – almost powerless.
For its part, the powerful business class was denied 
its usual place within elected bodies and political parties. 
Under Mubarak this class had operated through represen-
tative and political institutions, especially the parliament 
and ruling party, and had repeatedly exhibited its power 
and ability to challenge and somewhat embarrass the mil-
itary-led regime.7 Now business interests had no choice 
but to work through the media and informal channels 
within the state. While it reportedly invested heavily in 
ousting the MB from power, the business class hardly has 
grounds to be pleased with the outcome, as the military 
seems to be expanding its economic activities and almost 
monopolizing business with the state. 
As for the military, while it seems to be the primary (if 
not sole) winner of recent political developments, it now 
occupies a rather uncomfortable position, for it stands 
at the forefront of an ever-shrinking ruling alliance and 
its interests are decidedly at odds with its major partners 
(the business class, which demands more space, and the 
police, who are uncomfortable with their new secondary 
position to the military). The “war on terrorism,” al-
though it provides glue to hold the regime together, will 
not suffice to silence the demands of the military’s power-
ful partners.
Whose Pharaoh?
Even before the presidential elections of May 2014, it was 
clear that General Sisi embodied all the contradictions 
of the fragmented ruling alliance. He was nearly every-
body’s nominee. The military supported him explicitly. 
Numerous business cronies funded his campaign. Back-
ing from the Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates) was evident. And various state 
institutions either hinted their support for his candidacy 
or viciously smeared his only opponent, Hamdeen Sabahi, 
who won less than 4 percent of the vote. Sisi won with a 
landslide of 96.1 percent. 
This overwhelming majority, combined with the fact 
that opposition forces were badly bleeding and practically 
nullifying each other, presented Sisi with a unique oppor-
tunity: to forge a Restoration-cum-Revolution. The formu-
la could have allowed for the restructuring (rather than 
the mere restoration) of the Egyptian state in a way that 
reestablished its popular legitimacy and made it more 
relevant and sustainable. It was not long, however, before 
it became evident that the president was not, in fact, a 
pharaoh – an all-powerful, absolute monarch – but a mere 
political actor unsuccessfully attempting to homogenize 
his ruling alliance through coercive and ideological tools. 
Furthermore, he was meeting increasing resistance from 
the different segments of his alliance, which due to a lack 
of alternatives fought, and continue to fight, their differ-
ent battles through him. For example, different televi-
sions hosts, appearing on businessmen-owned channels, 
with alleged relations to different security institutions 
and all outspoken supporters of the president, explicitly 
engage in internal smear campaigns to discredit one 
another. Infighting of this sort rarely takes place under 
“successful” dictatorships.
Another telling example is the fact that the president 
himself, after more than a year in office, is still incapable 
of articulating a clear position on the 2011 upheavals. 
This is because any position taken would offend and 
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exclude certain groups within the ruling alliance. Each 
faction holds a different position on the upheaval – on the 
Mubarak regime, on the police, on business interests, on 
the effectiveness of neoliberal policies, etc. – and uses it 
to promote specific interests, while pushing other actors 
to the back seat or even seeking to evict them from the 
alliance.
There is another factor contributing to the president’s 
weakness. Because of his military background, he lacks 
the political vision necessary to undertake needed re-
structuring. Despite an unprecedented level of urgency, 
he has repeatedly failed over the past year to respond to 
crucial challenges, including questions of state-society re-
lations, the centralization of the state, and how to under-
take security sector reform. Instead of revising policy, he 
seems more inclined to maintain existing policies, while 
resorting to military personnel to ensure higher levels of 
discipline and order. This orientation further alienates 
and provokes others in the alliance and is hardly a fruit-
ful way of enforcing bureaucratic reform or success. 
Of course the president is not a passive player in the 
power struggles of his allies. Indeed, he has used the tools 
at hand to undermine institutional checks and balances 
and consolidate his own power. Most importantly, he has 
(ab)used the legislative vacuum of his first 18 months in 
power to issue dozens of presidential decrees and repeat-
edly uses the spectacle of military power to emphasize his 
position as sovereign. Further, he had used his presiden-
tial powers to repeatedly dismiss senior intelligence offi-
cers – allegedly the ones opposed to his rule. “Opposition” 
to this orientation from within the alliance is growing, 
however, as he chooses to rely on the military as, both a 
ruling “political party” (whose members are taking over 
different government positions) and a central instrument 
of personal power and not as a state institution subject to 
the usual rules of institutional oversight.
The practical obliteration of political parties and the 
president’s continued monopoly over how the ruling al-
liance is represented (for example, by silencing potential 
candidates from within the alliance that could stand up 
to him, notably former army generals Ahmed Shafiq and 
Sami Annan) has brought about a resemblence to classic 
one-party political systems. The difference between Sisi’s 
alliance and a one-party system, however, is that Sisi is 
not affiliated with a party. This means that the president 
has himself taken on the role of this party. Political de-
mands are therefore not channeled against him, for there 
is no space for this type of opposition. Rather, they are 
channeled through him – that is, different factions of the 
alliance push for their interests by propagating a certain 
image of the president.
This has had a dramatic impact on Egypt’s political 
scene. The contradictions within the alliance are so acute 
that they prevent the establishment of a single political 
party representing all of its interests. While the weaker 
elements of the alliance (namely the business communi-
ty) fought for their power through the 2015 parliamentary 
elections, the stronger elements, namely the military and 
the judiciary, continued to resist the very idea of conduct-
ing these elections. When it became unavoidable, their 
strategy shifted to minimizing the (inevitable) power 
sharing associated with the election of a parliament. The 
heavy securitization of the public sphere meant that only 
“friendly” candidates were allowed to run, leaving no 
room for political opposition. But even within this friend-
ly domain, the powerful elements limited power sharing 
through explicit intervention in party lists and parlia-
mentary alliances. Further, the incumbent parliament is 
rendered insignificant and weak, thanks to the low voter 
turnout, its scandalous procedures, and the president’s 
proposed constitutional amendments, put forward even 
before the elections to further consolidate power at the 
presidential palace.
Taken together, these measures are increasingly 
contributing to the “death of politics” and the subsequent 
preemption of the birth of the new. They are simultane-
ously speeding up the death of the old, with the president 
increasingly ruling through the state institutions rather 
than from within a political system.8 One could argue, 
however, that state institutions themselves – particularly 
the military– are increasingly acting as de facto political 
parties. The military marked the completion of Sisi’s first 
year in office with a publication listing his achievements 
that was as carefully designed and professionally pack-
aged as a party brochure.
The Collapse of Negotiation:  
A State of War and Revenge
As the fragile ties that once kept state institutions in-
tegrated decay and as the battle of “fiefdoms” gains 
intensity, both discipline and the rule of law erode. The 
overlapping challenges confronting post-2013 Egypt 
seriously undermine the state’s ability to sustain itself. 
In addition to the horizontal and vertical institutional 
fragmentation described above, these challenges include 
the state’s longstanding failure to deliver social services. 
They also include the re-institutionalization of a de facto 
state of emergency in the name of the “war on terrorism.” 
Security threats are increasingly permitting the state to 
resort to extralegal measures in flagrant disregard of the 
rule of law and observance of the constitution.
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How the state meets these challenges has a grave 
impact both on the internal dynamics of the state and its 
position vis-à-vis society. For one thing, the state un-
dermines its ideological makeup, rendering its violence 
ineffective. For another, it almost completely strips off the 
façade of raison d’état, with its acts being understood not 
as expressions of rule of law but of revenge.
The oppressive practices of a state’s institutions are 
only effective inasmuch as they violently force dissidents 
to align with the positions and ideology propagated by 
the political leadership. If that ideology is reasonably 
clear, then the state’s apparatuses – notably religious 
institutions, media, and education – are more or less 
synchronized. The absence (or extreme fragmentation) of 
that ideology, however, renders the state’s violence inef-
fective, for it ceases to become a force of alignment. 
Several indicators suggest that, in Egypt today, state 
violence, physical and non-physical alike, is directed 
in different and sometimes opposite directions due to 
competition both inside institutions and between them. 
Examples strongly suggestive of the intensity of intra-
institutional conflicts include the recurrent forced retire-
ments of senior officials in “sensitive” institutions – nota-
bly the intelligence services, the police, and the foreign 
service, and including a handful from the entourage both 
of the president and of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) – and the persistent “rumors” about the re-
lease of opposition activists sentenced to prison for speak-
ing out against the restrictive protest law. Meanwhile, 
violations of the law are tolerated, for example when 
junior officers in security institutions are permitted to 
make decisions on the use of lethal force and/or random, 
arbitrary arrests, illustrating the degree to which internal 
and external disputes affect the overall levels of discipline 
in the security establishment. In one important sense, the 
escalation of violence within Egypt’s state institutions 
reflects the failure, or rather the collapse, of negotiation 
between these institutions. These – in the context of the 
absence of rule of law – have adopted a Darwinist ap-
proach to defend their personal and institutional interests.
This erosion of law is also evident in the state’s “war 
on terrorism.” Over the past months, the state showed 
its growing tendency to discard both the law and its own 
norms and traditions. It has acted not in accordance with 
the national interest but rather according to the logic of 
the fotowwa – the benign neighborhood thug, who both 
exploits his neighbors and defends them against aliens, 
violating the law in both cases. To name a few examples, 
this is evident in the state’s enforcement of a death sen-
tence during Al-Ashhur Al-Hurum – the sanctified months 
in the Islamic calendar during which bloodshed is prohib-
ited – in violation of a centuries-old tradition; in the kill-
ing last July of a dozen MB leaders who had been arrested 
one day after a terrorist attack that targeted the general 
prosecutor Hesham Barakat; in the president’s assertion, 
two days after Barakat’s assassination, that “justice is be-
ing held back by the rule of law”; in the vindictive (to say 
the least) videos and photos and comments shared by the 
military spokesman on the military operations in Sinai 
(proudly announcing the killing of tens and sometimes 
hundreds of extremists, without any investigation, and 
with images of their corpses); and in the recent state-
ments made (ironically) by the minister of justice, calling 
for the killing of ten thousand MB members in retaliation 
for each soldier killed in a terrorist attack in Sinai. 
In these and other cases, the state (which, at present 
can be used synonymously with the political system) 
seems keen to belittle the importance of the law and to 
portray itself, not as a neutral, law-abiding body, but 
rather as a warrior engaged in a battle against a faction 
of society: namely, the Islamists. As such, the notion 
of “restoring the state” upon which the ruling alliance 
had based its activities has been replaced by the notion 
of “state of war,” where only warlords – in this particular 
capacity – have a legitimate presence in the public sphere, 
and where politics is evidently dead. 9
Certainly war is the only thing that keeps the ruling 
alliance relatively intact and capable of silencing its less 
powerful factions. The real paradox is that, while the gen-
erals fear that ending this war will lead to the collapse of 
the ruling elite (and, by extension, of the state), it is this 
very state of war that enables practices and processes that 
transform bureaucratic, judiciary, and security institu-
tions from the quasi-state entities into separate fiefdoms 
and, as such, seriously risks bringing about their col-
lapse. Ironically, it is the very same track adopted by the 
military and the judiciary – in the name of fulfilling their 
traditional role as “guardians of the state” – that will most 
likely deal the deathblow to Egypt’s century-old adminis-
trative apparatus.
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